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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the biotechnology (biotech) industry, companies must be in-
creasingly aware of their intellectual property and how their licens-
ing strategies can impact their rights.  When licensing patented tech-
nology, it is common practice for biotech companies to include re-
stricted field-of-use provisions in their license agreements.
1
  Such 
provisions permit a licensee to only use licensed technology in a de-
fined field and restrict use or development in another field.
2
  This 
licensing strategy plays an important role within the biotech industry 
because it allows companies to more effectively control their intel-
lectual property and to more efficiently research and develop phar-
maceutical products.
3
   
A problem that occurs in the biotech industry is when a company 
promotes the ―off-label‖ use of an already-approved drug—a use 
that may be covered by another‘s patent, though perhaps undeve-
loped or unlicensed.
4
  This problem can be an unforeseen side effect 
of utilizing biological material to develop drugs that may have many, 
and often unknown, indications for disease treatments.  One way to 
control off-label use promotion is through patent license agreements.  
Unfortunately, for many biotech licensors, patent licenses may not 
always prevent off-label use promotion.  To illustrate, a licensee (or 
a third party downstream of the license agreement) could promote a 
drug approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), devel-
oped from licensed technology, for an unapproved treatment covered 
  
 1. See Jeffrey P. Somers, Morse Barnes-Brown Pendleton PC, Biotech/Patent 
Licensing: Key Considerations in Deal Negotiations, http://www.mbbp.com 
/resources/iptech/biotech_patent_licensing.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2010). 
 2. BRIAN G. BRUNSVOLD & DENNIS P. O‘REILLY, DRAFTING PATENT LICENSE 
AGREEMENTS 39 (5th ed. 2004).   
 3. See Somers, supra note 1. 
 4. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL‘Y L. & ETHICS 717, 731 (2005).  
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by the licensor‘s patent that the party was not given the right to de-
velop.   
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that activity outside of the li-
censed field can constitute patent infringement because the patent 
owner has not transferred the rights for use or product development 
in that field.
5
  However, in 2008, the Supreme Court, in Quanta 
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,
6
 implied that the patent hold-
er in this situation may have exhausted its rights by licensing the 
technology and, therefore, cannot sue a third party for infringement 
even if the use being promoted is covered by the patent.
7
   
This Note discusses how Quanta should be interpreted and ap-
plied in the context of field-of-use restrictions in biotech license 
agreements and how a biotech licensor may sue for patent infringe-
ment as a remedy for downstream off-label use promotion when it 
licenses technology to be developed within a restricted field.  Sec-
tion I provides an overview of the biotech industry and how patent 
licensing plays an essential role in the growth and continuation of 
the industry.  Section II highlights the problem of off-label use pro-
motion and how the FDA appears to fall short of adequate regulation 
in this area.  Section III outlines how the doctrine of exhaustion af-
fects patent license agreements, specifically in the wake of Quanta.  
Section IV discusses the post-Quanta application of the doctrine of 
exhaustion to biotech licenses that incorporate field-of-use restric-
tions and how licensors should respond to Quanta when drafting 
license agreements to prevent off-label use.   
  
 5. See Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 126 (1938). 
 6. 553 U.S. 617 (2008). 
 7. See id. at 638. 
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II.  BACKGROUND OF PATENT LICENSING IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY 
INDUSTRY 
A.  Brief Overview of the Biotechnology Industry  
Biotechnology itself goes back as far as the development of fer-
mentation techniques in ancient Egypt,
8
 but the biotechnology indus-
try that we know today has its origins in the 1970s and 1980s when a 
new industry began exploiting biological processes instead of tradi-
tional chemical methods in order to solve problems and invent prod-
ucts.
9
  One of the first biotechnology drugs to emerge was human 
insulin in genetically-modified bacteria in 1982.
10
  Since then, the 
biotech industry has produced more than four hundred approved 
drugs and vaccines for a variety of diseases including cancer, heart 
disease, diabetes, AIDS, and multiple sclerosis.
11
  Since its emer-
gence, the industry has grown dramatically
12
 and continues to make 





 8. DuPont Biotechnology, History of Biotechnology, 
http://www2.dupont.com/Biotechnology/en_US/intro/history.html (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2010). 
 9. CLAUDE BARFIELD & JOHN E. CALFEE, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE PATENT 
SYSTEM: BALANCING INNOVATION AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 3 (2007).   
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 3–4.  
 12. An annual review of the biotech industry revealed ―1,456 firms, of which 
336 are publicly traded, . . . a total U.S. market capitalization of about $400 bil-
lion[,] . . . U.S. revenues [that] grew from $8 billion in 1992 to $51 billion in 
2005,‖ and private financing amounting to almost $100 billion from the years 
2000–2005 combined and $20.3 billion in 2006.  See id. at 4 (citing ERNST & 
YOUNG, RESILIENCE: AMERICA‘S BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT 7 (2007)).  
 13. For example, research from the biotech industry has made it possible to se-
quence the complete human genome, which has led to diagnostic testing for genet-
ic disorders and forensic DNA testing.  Brief of the Biotechnology Industry Or-
ganization as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 2, Quanta Computer, 
Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (No. 06-937), 2007 WL 3353099, at 
*3 [hereinafter BIO Amicus Brief].  It has also enhanced agricultural production 
through seed technology to make crops more resistant to insects and herbicides, 
increasing the U.S. farm income by $10.7 billion.  Id. at 3. 
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B.  Biotech License Agreements 
In the biotech industry, bringing a product or drug to market can 
often involve a lengthy and extensive collaboration between research 
universities and small and large biotechnology or biopharmaceutical 
companies.
14
  To illustrate, a university might patent technology de-
rived from a university researcher‘s discovery of a protein linked to 
a certain disease, such as cancer, and then license the technology to a 
small biotech company, which will invest the necessary capital and 
time to develop the technology to produce real-world applications, 
such as diagnostic methods or therapeutic treatments.
15
  This mutual-
ly beneficial arrangement will provide the university with the reve-
nue to support more academic research and will provide the small 
biotech company the exclusive patent rights that will attract invest-
ments for research and development (R&D), which, over time, will 
increase the value of the patented technology.
16
   
Additionally, as the value of the patented technology grows and 
becomes more widely used and scientifically validated, more specia-
lized biotechnology companies may enter into the R&D process to 
develop the technology toward specific indications or ―fields of 
use.‖17  Eventually, larger companies with more resources may be-
come involved in order to help with the cost and burden of develop-
ing a useful application or therapeutic product from the patented 
technology.
18
  The interplay between universities, small biotech 
companies, and larger biopharmaceutical entities is a crucial aspect 
  
 14. Id. at 4.  
 15. For every successful product from biotechnology innovation, approximately 
10,000 other attempts will fail to yield any success.  Id. at 5.  The time required to 
bring a drug from clinical development, through regulatory approval, and into the 
marketplace averages about eight years.  Id.    
 16. Id. at 6. 
 17. Id.  
 18. BIO Amicus Brief, supra note 13, at 6.  For example, a patented drug, which 
was used to treat an aggressive form of breast cancer, and was based on the identi-
fication of a specific gene, cost more than $200 million, took almost twenty years 
to develop, and involved collaborative research efforts between companies and a 
university.  See ROBERT BAZELL, HER-2: THE MAKING OF HERCEPTIN, A 
REVOLUTIONARY TREATMENT FOR BREAST CANCER 33, 37–38, 45, 48, 53–54  
(1998).   
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of the biotech industry.  It ensures the viability of the small and pub-
licly-funded biotech companies that otherwise may not be able to 
afford licensing fees or R&D costs and also makes it possible for 
researchers and inventors to successfully navigate the complicated 
and expensive road to commercial use of their innovations.
19
 
An important tool in this interplay is the patent license, which al-
lows patent owners to license their patent rights to others.  The pri-
mary function of licensing patent rights is to allow inventions to be 
put to ―their most valuable uses by the people best able to use 
them.‖20  In most situations, other entities can manufacture, market, 
or sell an invention better than the patent owner, and the ability to 
license the invention increases both the value of the specific inven-
tion and the general value of inventive efforts because it provides an 
incentive for people to make inventions regardless of their ability to 
successfully bring a product to market.
21
   
An essential component to the patent license is the patent own-
er‘s right to control the scope and the terms of the patent license.22  
A patent owner may employ the following limitations when granting 
a patent license: a licensee may only have the right to sell 1) a cer-
tain type of the product; 2) to certain customers; 3) in certain geo-
graphic areas; 4) for a limited amount of time; and/or 5) in limited 
amounts.
23
   
A frequently employed clause in biotech licensing is the field-of-
use restriction through which a patent owner grants a licensee the 
right to use a patented invention, but only in a specific, well-defined 
way.
24
  The field-of-use restriction divides the license rights among 
various applications or fields and is a useful tool, especially for al-
lowing the patent owner to generate license revenue without creating 
  
 19. BIO Amicus Brief, supra note 13, at 6.  
 20. John W. Schlicher, The New Patent Exhaustion Doctrine of Quanta v. LG: 
What It Means for Patent Owners, Licensees, and Product Customers, 90 J. PAT & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC‘Y 758, 767 (2008).  
 21. See id. 
 22. See id. 
 23. Id. at 773. 
 24. See Mark R. Patterson, Contractual Expansion of the Scope of Patent In-
fringement Through Field-of-Use Licensing, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV 157, 159 
(2007).  
2010 EXHAUSTED OR UNLICENSED 163 
competition in its own market.
25
  To illustrate, a compound devel-
oped by a biotech company might have many potential uses (preven-
tive, diagnostic, or therapeutic) for several different diseases, per-
haps in both humans and animals.
26
  In drafting a license agreement, 
the patent owner will want a narrow field of use that will reserve the 
opportunity to exploit other potential uses of the compound for the 
owner/licensor.
27
  For example, there may be indications that the 
compound may treat two different diseases, such as diabetes and 
leukemia.
28
  A hypothetical biotech company may be interested in 
licensing the compound because the company focuses on developing 
cancer treatments, but it is unlikely that the company would want to 
invest in the development of the compound for diabetes treatments.
29
  
The biotech company may, however, want a broad field of use or no 
field-of-use restriction because it is investing early in the develop-
ment stage and does not want to lock itself into a specific use and 
then miss out later on a more successful use that is not included in 
the licensed field.
30
  In this situation, if the patent owner licenses its 
rights to the company to develop the compound without a field-of-
use restriction to leukemia, the patent owner will risk depriving itself 
of the ability to develop or further license the compound in the field 
of diabetes or for any other potential use.
31
   
III.  OFF-LABEL USE PROMOTION IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY 
While field-of-use restrictions are, for the most part, successful 
in affording patent owners some control over their intellectual prop-
erty, the off-label use market creates potential problems for patent 
owners in the biotech industry.  The ―off-label‖ use of a drug occurs 
  
 25. BRUNSVOLD & O‘REILLY, supra note 2, at 39.   
 26. See Somers, supra note 1.  
 27. Id.  
 28. See id. (discussing similar patent research). 
 29. See id. 
 30. See id. (―From your client‘s perspective, it would like . . . a world-wide ex-
clusive license of and under all of the patents related to the engineered peptide.  
Having paid for the discovery of the multi-purpose compound, its position is that it 
is entitled to all of the potential value of the discovery.‖). 
 31. See id. 
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when a drug is used or prescribed ―for a purpose other than that for 
which the FDA has approved the drug as safe and effective.‖32  For 
example, a drug may be approved by the FDA as safe and effective 
for use in the treatment of diabetes but has an indication (another 
use) as a potentially effective treatment of leukemia.  If a doctor 
were to prescribe the approved diabetes drug to treat a patient suffer-
ing from leukemia, this would constitute an ―off-label‖ use. 
The off-label use problem within the biotech industry occurs 
more often between generic drug manufacturers and brand-name 
drug manufacturers.
33
  However, off-label use may also become an 
issue between biotech companies and universities involved in licens-
ing arrangements.  For example, a licensee or a downstream third 
party could develop a drug from licensed technology within the li-
censed field, gain FDA approval for that drug for a specific treat-
ment within that licensed field, and bring the drug to market.  It may 
then discover that the drug has indications for an unapproved use to 
treat a different disease and promote the drug for that unapproved 
use, which is outside the scope of the licensed field, in order to capi-
talize on a different and potentially more profitable treatment mar-
ket.  Additionally, under current FDA guidelines, the company could 
disseminate information from scientific research for the yet unap-
proved use of that drug to doctors, who could begin prescribing the 
drug to patients.
34
  In this scenario, the patent owner/licensor may 
lose the market for the patented, but unapproved use, because it li-
censed its rights and will not be able to control the downstream im-
plementations of other uses of its technology.  
A.  FDA Regulation of the Off-Label Use Market 
Once the FDA approves a drug for one use in a particular set of 
patients, doctors are free to prescribe that drug for any use in any 
  
 32. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 359 n.57 (2007). 
 33. See Carrie Stewart Martin, Proving Inducement of Infringement of Method-
of-Use Patents in Hatch-Waxman Act Litigation: Are the Standards Realistic for 
the Pharmaceutical Industry?, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 163, 167 (2004). 
 34. See FDA Dissemination of Information on Unapproved/New Uses for Mar-
keted Drugs, Biologics, and Devices, 21 C.F.R. § 99.101 (2010);  see also 
Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 369. 
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patient, even without clinical trial data to support the safety and effi-
cacy of the drug outside of its approved use.
35
  To elaborate, as soon 
as a new drug is approved and reaches the market, the FDA will not 
prevent its prescription for an off-label use that was not tested; the 
FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine or interfere with a 
doctor‘s best judgment on what treatment to prescribe for its pa-
tients.
36
  Prescribing drugs for off-label uses is a significant part of 
medical practice in certain specialties, such as oncology,
37
 and it is 
common for off-label sales to account for a significant portion of the 
sales of a lucrative drug.
38
  The off-label use market has emerged in 
the biotech industry because clinical trials to test new uses for al-
ready approved drugs are not only expensive, but can also be risky 
for a company if the testing of a lucrative drug yields a negative or 
harmful result.
39
   
Even though the FDA does not have authority to prevent doctors 
from prescribing approved drugs for off-label uses, the agency has 
some authority to regulate the marketing claims made by drug manu-
facturers regarding off-label uses of drug products.
40
  The FDA has 
authority under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)
41
 to re-
gulate the promotional materials of pharmaceutical companies, 
which include: print, broadcast, and Internet advertisements; visual 
aids, handouts, and other materials produced for dissemination to 
healthcare professionals; and brochures, letters, flyers, and other ma-
terials produced for dissemination to patients.
42
  The FDA supports 
  
 35. Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 369. 
 36. Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 731. 
 37. Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 369–70. 
 38. Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 731. 
 39. See id. at 732 n.65 (citing, as an example, the reduced sales of the drug 
Prempro, after the National Institute of Health found increased risk of heart dis-
ease after the hormone replacement drug was being prescribed to prevent heart 
disease in women). 
 40. Id. at 733.  The FDA has had some difficulty enforcing this authority because 
companies have asserted that regulating their marketing efforts is a violation of 
their First Amendment rights to disseminate information about their drugs to doc-
tors.  See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 375–77 (2002).  
 41. 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2006). 
 42. See Michelle M. Mello et al., Shifting Terrain in the Regulation of Off-Label 
Promotion of Pharmaceuticals, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1557, 1558 (2009).  
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its authority to regulate this area by stating that it ensures that pro-
motional communications are ―truthful, balanced, not misleading in 
their representations or omissions, and supported by substantial evi-
dence from clinical trials or clinical experience‖43 in order to: 1) 
make certain that doctors receive accurate and unbiased information 
in order to make informed decisions on prescriptions; and 2) provide 
manufacturers with incentives to test previously unapproved uses 
and submit them for FDA approval.
44
   
Over the years, however, changes in FDA policy toward off-
label use promotion have created uncertainty and have eroded confi-
dence that the FDA has any real regulatory power over the off-label 
use promotion activities of biopharmaceutical companies.
45
  First, 
the FDA Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA)
46
 permitted manu-
facturers of drugs and biologics to disseminate peer-reviewed scien-
tific journal articles, but the manufacturers were permitted to do so 
only if the off-label use described in the articles was included, or 
would be included, in a supplemental new drug application and if the 
manufacturers provided the FDA with advance copies of any mate-
rials they planned to disseminate.
47
  However, Congress allowed the 
FDAMA provisions to expire in 2006,
48
 which left some confusion 
as to where the FDA stood on regulation of off-label use promo-
tion.
49
   
  
 43. Id. 
 44. Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 372.  The FDCA does not directly preclude off-
label use promotion, but two provisions effectively give the FDA the regulatory 
authority over this activity: 1) pharmaceutical manufacturers are prohibited from 
introducing a drug into interstate commerce unless the drug and its label have 
FDA approval (marketing drugs for off-label use would violate this provision); 
and 2) manufacturers are prohibited from introducing misbranded drugs into inter-
state commerce (including information about unapproved uses qualifies as mi-
sbranding).  21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a)–(c), 355(a) (2006); see also FDA New Drugs, 21 
C.F.R. § 310.3(h) (2010); FDA Prescription Drug Advertising, 21 C.F.R. 
§ 202.1(e)(4) (2010).  
 45. See Mello et al., supra note 42, at 1558–59. 
 46. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006). 
 47. FDA Dissemination of Information on Unapproved/New Uses for Marketed 
Drugs, Biologics, and Devices, 21 C.F.R. § 99.101 (2010).   
 48. See Mello et al., supra note 42, at 1559. 
 49. Perhaps Congress was responding to challenges that regulation of activities 
in this area violated constitutional rights, specifically the First Amendment right of 
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Second, changes made in draft FDA guidelines in January 2009 
will allow companies to distribute reprints of peer-reviewed journal 
articles relating to doctors describing off-label uses.
50
  These guide-
lines have been characterized as a clarification of existing policy 
rather than a change in policy direction, but have been criticized as 
more permissive than the FDAMA or previous FDA policy for three 
reasons: 1) dissemination of peer-reviewed articles is explicitly al-
lowed; 2) companies are not restricted to promoting off-label uses 
for which the company will file a supplemental new drug applica-
tion; and 3) companies do not have to submit their promotional ma-
terials to the FDA in advance.
51
  Although drug companies may wel-
come these FDA guidelines because the guidelines are less restric-
tive on marketing activities, there are concerns that these guidelines 
will result in publication bias in scientific literature, misleading re-
presentations or interpretations of data in peer-reviewed journals, 
dissemination of low-quality studies merely because they support a 
pharmaceutical agenda, suppression of data on safety risks, and in-
creasing conflicts of interest resulting from journal articles written 
by researchers who are sponsored by pharmaceutical companies.
52
  
To illustrate these concerns, a 2006 study of the prescription of off-
label uses of common drugs found that while off-label use made up 
21% of all prescriptions, 73% of these off-label uses had little or no 
scientific support.
53
  Figure 1 provides an illustration that breaks 





drug manufacturers to engage in commercial speech.  Mello et al., supra note 42, 
at 1559 (citing Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998), 
vacated in part by Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).  
 50. Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 733–34; see also Dissemination of Information 
on Unapproved/New Uses for Marketed Drugs, Biologics, and Devices, 21 C.F.R. 
§ 99.1 (2010).    
 51. Mello et al., supra note 42, at 1560.  
 52. Id. at 1563. 
 53. Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Use—Rethinking the Role of the 
FDA, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1428 (2008).   







In addition, there are broader concerns that individuals, universi-
ties, or biotech companies may not be able to rely on the FDA‘s reg-
ulatory authority to provide them with a remedy in situations where 
unsafe drugs may harm patients as a result of off-label use promo-
tion, or in situations where a company is promoting its drug for an 
off-label use protected by another‘s patent. 
 
B.  Patents, the Off-Label Use Market, and the Role of Field-of-Use 
Restrictions 
To circumvent the problem of off-label use promotion in the ab-
sence of more restrictive FDA regulation, the biotech industry relies 
on the protection of patent law.  The biotech industry depends heavi-
ly on patent protection to support the costs of researching and devel-
oping pharmaceutical products and consistently seeks stronger patent 
rights.
55
  Patent law allows a patent owner to sue any party that 
―without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented 
invention, within the United States . . . .‖56  Additionally, patents on 
  
 54. Id.  
 55. Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 721.  
 56. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).  
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pharmaceutical products and processes, such as drugs and methods 
of treatment, ―motivate firms to invest in data production in order to 
develop markets for their inventions.‖57  Data from clinical trials 
regarding new uses of these pharmaceutical inventions can expand 
the market for a drug product, and patents on these uses can be em-
ployed to ―exclude free riders from competing for these sales during 
the patent term.‖58   
One problem with patent protection in this area—and the main 
reason that off-label use promotion is increasingly prevalent—is 
that, even for a successful clinical trial, the patent term may not be 
well timed to allow patent owners to capitalize on the value of the 
data, especially for clinical trials on new uses of the drug.
59
  For ex-
ample, the timeline of drug development often places the discovery 
of new compounds before the therapeutic value can be determined or 
established by clinical trials.
60
  Because patent law promotes early 
filing in order to avoid the risk of losing protection due to statutory 
bars and standards of novelty, inventors file patent applications on 
new compounds as soon as reasonably possible—even if it may be 
years before a drug is commercially viable or a treatment is well un-
derstood.
61
  New data on uses of an existing compound can some-
times permit the developer to obtain a process patent (as opposed to 
patenting the compound itself), such as when clinical trials show the 
drug works for a new indication or new method of treatment.
62
  The 
new method of treatment can be patent eligible even though the 
same drug has previously been used for another purpose.
63
  Howev-
er, process patent claims limited to a particular use of a compound 
are considered less valuable in the industry than product patent 
claims covering the drug itself because a narrower process patent 
cannot stop a competitor from selling the drug for other uses not 
covered by the patent.
64
   
  
 57. Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 721. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 722.  
 60. Id. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at 724. 
 63. Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 724. 
 64. Id. 
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In the context of off-label use, patent owners may enforce the 
process patent against consumers who take the drug for the patented 
use, the doctors who prescribe the drug for the patented use, the 
pharmacists who fill prescriptions, or competitors who encourage 
use of their generic version of the drug.
65
  But the enforcement op-
tion is not often employed because: 1) remedies for this course of 
action are generally unsatisfactory; 2) detection of infringing uses is 
difficult; and 3) suing numerous patients and doctors is not effi-
cient.
66
  Additionally, it is generally not in a company‘s best interests 
from a marketing perspective to sue its customers—patients and doc-
tors—for patent infringement.67     
C. Contributory Infringement in Off-Label Use Scenarios 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), ―[w]hoever actively induces in-
fringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.‖68  In the con-
text of off-label use promotion, a drug manufacturer promoting a 
drug for an unapproved use—a use covered by another‘s patent—
could be liable as an infringer if the promotion activity amounts to 
actively encouraging purchasers of the drug to use it in a way that is 
patented and unlicensed.
69
  For patent owners faced with a down-
stream party promoting the off-label use of a drug, it might be a bet-
ter course of action to pursue a remedy against the downstream party 
under a theory of contributory infringement instead of suing doctors 
or patients.   
However, a theory of contributory infringement is not without 
difficulty; courts have required ―specific intent and action to induce 
infringement‖ in situations involving off-label use promotion.70  To 
illustrate, in Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated that ―[e]specially where a 
  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 724–25.  
 68. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2006).  
 69. See generally Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 621 
(2008); Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 126–27 
(1938); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 702–03 (Fed. Cir. 
1992). 
 70. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  
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product has substantial noninfringing uses, intent to induce in-
fringement cannot be inferred even when the defendant has actual 
knowledge that some users of its product may be infringing the pa-
tent.‖71  Further, the court also rejected liability for infringing off-
label use of the drug
72
 and ruled that a company does not commit 
infringement by submitting an abbreviated new drug application 
(―ANDA‖) for approval to market a drug for a use when both the 
patent on the drug and the patent on the approved use were expired, 
even if a patent still existed covering a non-approved use of the 
drug.
73
  Simply stated, as it relates to generic drug applications, pa-
tent infringement does not apply to off-label uses because an ANDA 
cannot be obtained for a non-FDA approved use.
74
 
While Warner-Lambert is important for understanding the limi-
tations surrounding infringement in off-label use scenarios (the ―spe-
cific intent and action to induce infringement‖ requirement), in order 
to avoid confusion, it is important to narrowly apply its criteria for 
establishing contributory infringement.  For example, while Warner-
Lambert precludes liability for infringement where there is promo-
tion of a patented but non-approved use for a generic drug,
75
 it is not 
analogous to the situation of a patent owner enforcing rights against 
a downstream party to a license agreement.  In contrast, in a licens-
ing scenario, there is already an approved drug developed for a spe-
cific use, not a competing generic drug.  Further, in a licensing ar-
rangement, at issue is whether promotion of the approved drug for an 
  
 71. Id. at 1365. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1356.  Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, ANDAs can be filed for a gener-
ic drug that is the same as the approved drug in terms of active ingredient, dosage 
form strength, route of administration, labeling, or is ―bioequivalent‖ to the ap-
proved drug.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii)–(v).  The Act provides protection for 
the patent owner of the approved drug by requiring that the ANDA applicant certi-
fy the status of patents, which claim the drug or method of using the drug, and 
provides a thirty-month stay of FDA approval of the generic drug once litigation is 
initiated on certified patents even if the ANDA meets the criteria for approval.  See 
id. § 355(j). 
 74. The prohibited ―use‖ as defined in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) does not apply 
to off-label uses because an ANDA cannot be obtained for a non-FDA approved 
use.  Martin, supra note 33, at 167. 
 75. See Warner-Lambert Co., 316 F.3d at 1365. 
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unapproved but patented use qualifies as inducing infringement as a 
result of some breach of the license agreement with respect to the 
field restriction.  In this scenario, the analysis of whether patent in-
fringement has occurred is not whether Warner-Lambert precludes 
liability for off-label use promotion, but whether the downstream 
party to the license agreement had specific intent and action to in-
duce infringement through the promotion of its drug for the off-label 
use in violation of the license agreement.  Key to this patent in-
fringement analysis will be whether the patent owner/licensor has 
adequately defined the scope of the license grant and whether the 
doctrine of exhaustion has been triggered.  
IV.  THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION AND BIOTECH LICENSE 
AGREEMENTS 
According to the doctrine of exhaustion, which is also known as 
the ―first-sale doctrine,‖ the sale of a patented product by or with the 
permission of the patent owner will exhaust the patent rights to that 
product.
76
  If exhaustion has been triggered, the patent owner cannot 
control what the buyer or user of the patented good does with that 
good, nor sue the buyer or user for patent infringement.
77
  In the con-
text of license agreements, patent owners should be concerned with 
when exhaustion may be triggered, specifically if they seek to re-
strict certain uses of their patented technology through the license 
agreement.  To illustrate, biotech companies often utilize field-of-use 
restrictions in their license agreements to define the scope of the li-
cense, which is the area in which the patent owner agrees not to sue 
the licensee for patent infringement.
78
  Field-of-use restrictions in 
biotech licensing agreements should afford the patent owner protec-
tions going forward into R&D collaborations and provide remedies 
if a party breaches the agreement.
79
  Unfortunately, the legal support 
  
 76. Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 362; see also John. W. Osborne, A Coherent 
View of Patent Exhaustion: A Standard Based on Patentable Distinctiveness, 20 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 643, 646 (2004). 
 77. See Osborne, supra note 76, at 647. 
 78. See BIO Amicus Brief, supra note 13, at 17–18. 
 79. See id. at 18–19. 
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for field-of-use restrictions is currently in a confused state.
80
  Simply 
stated, recent U.S. Supreme Court case law suggests that there are 
strict limitations on licensing practices, such as field-of-use restric-
tions, which appears to be at odds with Federal Circuit case law as 
well as previous U.S. Supreme Court precedent.
81
   
A.  U.S. Supreme Court and Federal Circuit Field-of-Use Restric-
tions Precedent 
Field-of-use restrictions in licensing agreements were legitima-
tized by the U.S. Supreme Court in General Talking Pictures Corp. 
v. Western Electric Co., in which the Court stated that a patent own-
er ―may grant a license ‗upon any condition the performance of 
which is reasonably within the reward which the patentee by the 
grant of the patent is entitled to secure.‘‖82  General Talking Pictures 
involved a field restriction in a license agreement that allowed 
American Transformer Company to manufacture vacuum tubes from 
AT&T‘s patented technology for non-commercial use, but not for 
commercial use.
83
  The Court held that American Transformer Com-
pany and its purchaser, General Talking Pictures, were liable for 
patent infringement for manufacturing vacuum tubes for commercial 
theater use in violation of the license agreement.
84
   
Additionally, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has held that 
an express restriction precludes the doctrine of exhaustion unless 
there is some antitrust violation or patent misuse; the field restriction 
must be within the scope of the patent.
85
  For example, in Mallinck-
rodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., the Federal Circuit confirmed that a pur-
chaser of a patented product will infringe the patent when it uses the 
product in violation of a lawful restriction or condition as specified 
  
 80. See Patterson, supra note 24, at 164. 
 81. See id. 
 82. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 127 (1938) (quot-
ing United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926)).   
 83. See id. at 125–26. 
 84. See id. at 127. 
 85. See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(―Unless the condition violates some other law or policy (in the patent field, nota-
bly the misuse or antitrust law), private parties retain the freedom to contract con-
cerning conditions of sale.‖ (citation omitted)).  
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by the seller or patent owner at the time of the sale.
86
  In Mallinck-
rodt, Mallinckrodt, Inc. owned patents on a device for delivering 
chemicals in aerosol form to a patient‘s lungs.87  The devices were 
sold to hospitals as kits, and, although some parts were marked 
―Single Use Only‖ and included instructions that the entire kit 
should be disposed of after use, some of the hospitals did not dispose 
of the devices and, instead, shipped parts to Medipart, Inc., which 
sterilized them, reassembled them with new parts, and shipped the 
kits back to the hospitals.
88
  The court ruled that such use, in viola-
tion of a valid restriction, might be remedied under patent law be-




B.  Quanta and the Doctrine of Exhaustion Revisited 
While General Talking Pictures and Mallinckrodt upheld license 
restrictions and limited the application of the doctrine of exhaustion, 
in 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court revisited the doctrine of exhaustion 
in Quanta in a way that has created significant confusion across 
many industries that rely on patent licensing.
90
  The Court‘s opinion 
in Quanta reinforces the idea that ―the exclusive right in a patent 
claim is exhausted when an article embodying the ‗essential fea-
tures‘ of the claim is transferred in an authorized and unrestricted 
manner.‖91  Specifically at issue was 1) whether the doctrine of ex-
haustion applied to the sale of components of a patented system, 
where the components could be combined with unpatented compo-
nents in order to practice the patented method; and 2) whether the 
licensor‘s attempt to restrict downstream manufacturers from com-
bining these components was valid.
92
  For the biotech industry, how-
ever, this decision has created confusion over the Court‘s opaque 
interpretation of the term ―post-sale restriction,‖ whether or when 
  
 86. See id. at 701. 
 87. See id. at 701–02. 
 88. Id. at 702. 
 89. See id. at 708–09. 
 90. See Osborne, supra note 76, at 657. 
 91. Id. at 646; see also Schlicher, supra note 20, at 827. 
 92. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 621 (2008). 
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post-sale restrictions are invalid, and how to respond to what appears 
to be a stricter interpretation of the doctrine of exhaustion compared 
to Federal Circuit precedent and General Talking Pictures.
93
 
In Quanta, LG Electronics (―LGE‖) and Intel entered into a 
cross-licensing agreement in which LGE authorized Intel to ―make 
use, sell (directly or indirectly), offer to sell, import or otherwise 
dispose of‖ Intel products, but provided that no license would be 
―granted by either party hereto . . . to any third party for the combi-
nation by a third party . . . or for the use, import, offer for sale or sale 
of such combination.‖94  This license arrangement between LGE and 
Intel involved two separate agreements: a License Agreement and a 
Master Agreement.
95
  The License Agreement provided Intel the 
broad set of patent rights and also ensured that any Intel product pur-
chased by a third party would be licensed by LGE.
96
  However, the 
License Agreement included a provision that stated that the license 
would not extend to third-party products made by combining Intel 
products with any non-Intel product, which was an attempt to exert 
some control over the third-party licenses.
97
   
Furthermore, the Master Agreement required Intel to provide its 
customers with written notice of this provision but stated that a 
breach of the Master Agreement would not be grounds for termina-
tion of the License Agreement.
98
  Intel sold microprocessors and 
chip sets under the license to manufacturers, including Quanta, and 
Quanta used the microprocessors and chip sets to assemble comput-
ers that were sold for resale to computer users.
99
  The Court held that 
the components sold by Intel substantially embodied the inventions 
of LGE‘s patents, that Intel‘s sale to Quanta constituted an autho-
  
 93. See Schlicher, supra note 20, at 828. 
 94. Quanta Computer, Inc., 553 U.S. at 623 (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 8, 
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (No. 06-9307), 
2007 WL 3276505, at *7 [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners]). 
 95. See id. 
 96. See id. (citing Brief for Petitioners at 8). 
 97. See id. at 624 (citing Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 7, Quanta Com-
puter, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (No. 06-9307, 2007 WL 
760215, at *7 [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]). 
 98. See id. at 623–24 (citing Brief for Respondent at 7, 26). 
 99. See id. at 624. 
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Quanta has three significant consequences for the patent licens-
ing community.
101
  First, before Quanta, the Court applied the doc-
trine of exhaustion to prohibit an infringement claim against a pur-
chaser only when the patent owner (or licensee) sold a patented 
product that embodied all the features claimed by the patent.
102
  Fol-
lowing Quanta, in order to determine if exhaustion will apply, the 
patent owner needs to ―understand the novel features of each inven-
tion of each patent . . . and must make judgments about whether all 
those novel features are found in the product to be sold and whether 
there are alternative uses for the product at the time of the sale.‖103  
Second, in Quanta, the Court stated that ―post-sale‖ restrictions are 
invalid, which could mean that when exhaustion applies, patent 
owners may not sell a patented invention and then license the patent 
rights separately in a way that would reserve any patent rights.
104
  
Third, Quanta determined that exhaustion only applies to sales that 
the license agreement authorized a licensee to make, which, depend-
ing on the scope of the license agreement, means that a licensee 
could sell unpatented products to a purchaser who subsequently 




What Quanta leaves unclear is whether field-of-use restrictions 
in biotech license agreements qualify as the type of ―post-sale‖ re-
striction that the Court found invalid and whether patent owners will 
be precluded by the doctrine of exhaustion from enforcing patent 
rights against downstream uses of their patented technology even if 
they employ field-of-use restrictions.  
  
100. See Quanta Computer, Inc., 553 U.S. at 621 (―Because the exhaustion doc-
trine applies to method patents, and because the license authorizes the sale of 
components that substantially embody the patents in suit, the sale exhausted the 
patents.‖). 
101. See Schlicher, supra note 20, at 764. (―The language of the Quanta decision 
has three and perhaps four important consequences.‖). 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Quanta Computer, Inc., 553 U.S. at 638; see Schlicher, supra note 20, at 764. 
105. See Schlicher, supra note 20, at 764. 
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 V.  POST-QUANTA APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION 
TO THE BIOTECH INDUSTRY 
A.  Narrow Construction of Quanta and the Doctrine of Exhaustion 
In his article, The New Patent Exhaustion Doctrine of Quanta v. 
LG: What It Means for Patent Owners, Licensees, and Product Cus-
tomers, John Schlicher states that ―Quanta is understandable.  How-
ever, it is also unfortunate.  In this situation, an oddly written agree-
ment may have resulted in fundamental and sensible doctrines of 
patent law being swept away for no good reasons.‖106  
According to Schlicher, Quanta held that a patent owner could 
enter a license agreement with a purchaser who agrees to limit its use 
of the patented technology or product.
107
  However, the Court im-
plied that this kind of agreement may not be used by the patent own-
er to reserve any of its patent rights related to the purchaser‘s use of 
the product; the patent owner‘s only remedy in regard to the agree-
ment would be for breach of contract, not patent infringement.
108
  
Further, the Court stated that the initial authorized sale of a patented 
product terminated all the patent rights to that product, and that the 
initial authorized sale of an unpatented product that ―substantially 
embodies‖ a patented invention also terminates all the patent rights 
to invention.
109
    
In deciding this issue, the Court neither discussed the Federal 
Circuit‘s decision in Mallinckrodt regarding conditioned sales, nor 
analyzed the reasoning of General Talking Pictures regarding field-
of-use restrictions.  However, a careful reading of Quanta can find 
that neither Mallinckrodt nor General Talking Pictures has been ex-
pressly overruled.
110
  Instead, Quanta only affirmed that an autho-
rized sale by a licensee will trigger exhaustion.
111
  To illustrate, the 
Court interpreted the language of the Intel-LGE license agreement as 
  
106. Id. at 849.  
107. Id. at 836.  
108. See Quanta Computer, Inc., 553 U.S. at 637 n.7; Schlicher, supra note 20, at 
846. 
109. Quanta Computer, Inc., 553 U.S. at 637; see Schlicher, supra note 20, at 
793. 
110. See generally Quanta Computer, Inc., 553 U.S. at 621. 
111. See id. at 638. 
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imposing no express limitations on Intel‘s right to sell products to 
purchasers who would combine Intel‘s products with others to make 
computers.
112
  Specifically, the Court ruled that the Intel-LGE 
agreement ―broadly permits Intel to ‗make, use, [or] sell‘ products 
free of LGE‘s patent claims.‖113  Further, the Court held that Intel‘s 
authority to sell products containing LGE‘s patented technology was 
not conditioned on a notice appearing in the separate Master Agree-
ment, requiring Intel to give notice to customers that LGE did not 
license Intel customers to practice its patents.
114
  The Court held that 
this notice did not constitute an express limitation, and, because 
there was no express limitation in the license agreement, Intel‘s sale 
to Quanta was authorized, thereby triggering exhaustion and prec-
luding LGE from suing Quanta for patent infringement.
115
  Addi-
tionally, while not analyzing General Talking Pictures with any 
depth, Quanta appeared to interpret General Talking Pictures as 
holding that the licensee, American Transformer Company, did not 
breach the license agreement with AT&T but, instead, made a sale 
outside the scope of its license, therefore rendering the downstream 
manufacturer, General Talking Pictures, a patent infringer.
116
   
The Court in Quanta was narrowly applying the doctrine of ex-
haustion to a poorly written license agreement and was not attempt-
ing to broaden exhaustion to preclude field-of-use restrictions in any 
license agreement.  Quanta merely holds that a provision that re-
quired notification to the licensee‘s customers that they were not 
licensed to practice the licensor‘s patents was not a clear or express 
restriction on the licensee‘s rights.117  As a result, even though the 
Court did not provide guidance on how a clear or express restriction 
should be written, Quanta still supports the argument that selling 
  
112. See Quanta Computer, Inc., 553 U.S. at 635–37; Schlicher, supra note 20, at 
848.   
113. Quanta Computer, Inc., 553 U.S. at 636. 
114. See id. 
115. See id. at 637. 
116. See Schlicher, supra note 20, at 848 (citing Quanta Computer, Inc., 553 U.S. 
at 635–36); see also Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 
126 (1938). 
117. See Schlicher, supra note 20, at 848.  
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outside of the scope of a license agreement—an unauthorized sale—
can constitute patent infringement.
118
   
B.  Biotech License Agreements Should Be Structured to Prohibit the 
Doctrine of Exhaustion  
Under a narrow reading of Quanta, there are three scenarios that 
can prevent the doctrine of exhaustion from being triggered: 1) a sale 
was not authorized; 2) a purchaser lacked the authority to buy a pa-
tented product; or 3) the purchaser violated a reasonable restriction 
on alternative uses of the product that are within the scope of the 
patent rights.
119
  Underlying all of these scenarios is the premise, 
derived from General Talking Pictures, that a sale made without 
authority cannot confer rights on the purchaser because the seller 
cannot transfer rights that it does not have.
120
   
Additionally, even though the U.S. Supreme Court in Quanta 
confined its analysis to the specific LGE-Intel license agreement 
terms and did not attempt to address broader issues (such as how its 
holding might impact biotech or software industries), biotech licen-
sors should still be wary of triggering the doctrine of exhaustion.  
Obviously, in the biotech industry, the purpose of licensing patent 
rights through collaborative license agreements is to maintain the 
patent owner‘s rights, not to exhaust them.121  Further, the kinds of 
arrangements in the biotech industry—between patent owner and 
licensee, between patent owner and multiple licensees for the same 
product, or between patent owner, licensee, and sublicensee or third 
party—are not the kind of ―arms-length‖ sales with purchasers that 
the doctrine of exhaustion evolved to address.
122
  However, Quanta 
demonstrates that the Court will view a poorly written license re-
striction as an invalid attempt to exert control beyond the scope of 
the patent rights.  Therefore, despite a narrow interpretation of 
  
118. Id. at 848–49.  
119. BIO Amicus Brief, supra note 13, at 16. 
120. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp., 305 U.S. at 127; see also Mitchell v. Hawley, 
83 U.S. 544, 550 (1873) (―[N]o one can convey in such a case better title than he 
owns . . . .‖). 
121. BIO Amicus Brief, supra note 13, at 21. 
122. Id. at 21. 
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Quanta, field-of-use restrictions in biotech license agreements, while 
still valid provisions, will not always prevent exhaustion of one‘s 





As successful as the biotech industry has become in the last few 
decades, off-label use promotion is still a significant issue due to 
increased competition within the industry and a lack of strong FDA 
regulation.  Biotech companies often seek to combat off-label use 
promotion or other abuses of patent rights by including field-of-use 
restrictions in their license agreements.  While the Quanta and 
Warner-Lambert decisions create some uncertainty regarding wheth-
er field-of-use restrictions can be effective in combating off-label 
use promotion, Warner-Lambert should not be construed as prohibit-
ing patent infringement remedies against all forms of off-label use 
promotion, and Quanta should be narrowly interpreted as holding 
that only authorized sales by a licensee will trigger patent exhaus-
tion.   
In summary, patent owners in the biotech industry should be able 
to prevent off-label use promotion with carefully drafted field-of-use 
restrictions within license agreements.  However, such field-of-use 
restrictions must reasonably define the scope of the license, so that 
the doctrine of exhaustion will not be triggered when a licensee or 
downstream third party promotes a drug for an unlicensed and unap-
proved off-label use.  Otherwise, the licensee or third party could be 
held liable for patent infringement.  
 
  
123. See id. at 20.  
